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ARTICLES
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION NORM IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CHARTER LAW: NIXON V. VANCOUVER RAPE RELIEF
CHRISTINE BOYLE'
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to be free of discrimination is most prominently protected by two
types of legal instruments - the constitution, primarily in the form of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,' and human rights legislation.
However, discrimination does not necessarily mean the same thing at the
constitutional and legislative levels. Its meaning on the constitutional level is
now governed by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Law. While
Law is the Supreme Court of Canada's unanimous attempt to reconfigure and
synthesize equality law, it has been a matter of debate whether that synthesis
will be applied at the human rights level. At the moment, some, though not all,
human rights tribunals have rejected its applicability, while courts have
applied Law in cases where the argument has been made. This paper focuses
on the issue of whether the human rights concept of discrimination should be
consistent with the constitutional meaning.
An illustration of the possible significance of this issue is provided through
discussion of whether it is discrimination for a women's group to exclude male
to female transsexual persons, drawing to some extent on the issues arising out
of the human rights complaint made by Kimberly Nixon against Vancouver
Rape Relief Society in Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society.3 An analysis,
by counsel for Ms. Nixon, of the decision of the Tribunal was recently
published in this journal, under the title "Real Women: Kimberly Nixon v.
t Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. The author thanks Professors Bill
Black and Marilyn MacCrimmon for providing very helpful comments on a draft, as well as
Catalin Mitelut and Jesse Nyman for their research assistance.
I Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)
1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Law].
3 2001 BCHRT 1 [Nixon] (The author is co-counsel for Vancouver Rape Relief and
Women's Shelter in this case).
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Vancouver Rape Relief'.4 While this paper addresses the meaning of
discrimination more broadly, Nixon provides a useful illustration of the rare
case, that is, one involving equality claims in conflict, where the choice of the
meaning of discrimination in human rights law matters. To some extent
therefore, it is a response to "Real Women". In addition, since that comment
was published, the British Columbia Supreme Court, in a judicial review of
the Human Rights Tribunal decision allowing Ms. Nixon's complaint, has
overturned that decision.5 However, the debate about the meaning of
discrimination is likely to continue.
One consequence of a divergence between the human rights and
constitutional meanings of discrimination would be that private
individuals/groups might not be able to make distinctions and target programs
in ways permitted to the state.6 There is a possible theoretical foundation for
this, since bills of rights should be seen as establishing a minimum level of
protection for fundamental rights and freedoms, a level that legislatures are, to
some extent, free to change for private actors. However, in cases involving
human rights claims in conflict, the issue is the appropriate balance. The level
cannot be raised for some without being simultaneously lowered for others. As
well, in an era of increasing privatization of what would otherwise be
government programs, and thus increasing fuzziness of the public/private
distinction, different discrimination tests for "private" programs versus
government programs may be difficult to defend.7 A further concern is
whether insistence on a relatively formal approach to discrimination in the
human rights context could undermine a somewhat fragile commitment to
substantive equality at the constitutional level.
This paper is about the meaning of discrimination on the human rights
level. However, any debate about the human rights meaning could be seen
against a backdrop of debate about the constitutional meaning. While
substantive equality is often seen as providing a positive contrast to formal
equality at that level, not all would agree with that view. Furthermore, not all
4 barbara findlay, "Real Women: Kimberly Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief' (2003) 36
U.B.C.L.Rev. 57 [findlay, "Real Women"] (The author takes issue with some of the factual
characterizations in that article. At no point has Rape Relief taken the position that Ms. Nixon is
not a "real woman" or not "one of them" or that "protection from discrimination on the basis of
sex is available only to non-transsexual women" at 57).
5 See Vancouver Rape Relief Society v. Nixon et al., 2003 BCSC 1936 [Vancouver Rape
Reliefl.
6 This has both a substantive (in that the meaning of discrimination may vary) and a fact-
finding (in that the allocation of the burden of proof affects outcomes) dimension.
7 Stated more dramatically, leaving women's groups to defend themselves in the "private"
realm without the tools the government can use in the public realm reactivates familiar concerns
about the legal status of women.
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proponents of substantive equality would support the use of the concept of
human dignity, discussed below.8 It is not my purpose to engage in discussion
of the best approach to substantive equality in general. It may well be that
substantive equality could be promoted by a different pivotal concept than
dignity.9 Rather, I address the arguments about whether there should be a
consistent approach to discrimination in the human rights and constitutional
fields, given that there is some commitment to substantive equality in the
latter.
Tarnopolsky and Pentney have touched on this topic briefly, stating:
Charter jurisprudence is a source of authority for cases involving the anti-
discrimination provisions of human rights codes. Indeed it would be remarkable if
this were not the case, in view of the paramount authority of the Charter and the
almost precise identity between the grounds enumerated under s. 15 and those
identified in human rights enactments ...
The direction taken by the Supreme Court in Law and Granofsky is prima facie
binding on human rights tribunals in future decisions. It is submitted that these
decisions direct tribunals to look beyond differential treatment and nexus to
enumerated grounds of discrimination in order to assess the existence and/or
degree of incidental interference with claimants' personal dignity. The guiding
principles in this second phase of analysis must be both "purposive" and
"contextual" as those terms were elaborated inter alia in the Law case.
10
8 For discussion of the debate and a useful contribution to it, see Donna Greschner, "Does
Law Advance the Cause of Formal Equality?" (2001) 27 Queen's L.J. 300 [Greschner]. See also
Peter W.Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed., (Scarborough, Ont.: Thomson-
Carswell, 2003), who states at 1080: "The element of human dignity that has been injected into
the s.15 jurisprudence is, in my view, vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants".
On the other hand, for serious efforts to develop a conception of dignity in both tort and
discrimination law, see Denise G. Rdaume, "Harm and Fault in Discrimination Law: The
Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination" (2001) 2 Theor. Inq. L. 349;
Denise G. R~aume, "Indignities: Making a Place for Dignity in Modem Legal Thought" (2002)
28 Queens L. J. 61 (R6aume suggests that "there is a trend afoot to appeal more widely to the
value of dignity in interpreting and developing norms in a variety of contexts" at 93).
9 See e.g. Sheilah Martin, "Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals"
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299. Martin argues, at 329, "dignity belongs more to the realm of
individual rights than to group based historical disadvantage. ... [D]ignity may prove to be too
low or too ambiguous a common denominator if it removes from view how oppression
operates. The Court [in Law] said that the interests protected by human dignity relate to the
realization of personal autonomy and self-determination, self-respect, and physical and
psychological integrity and empowerment. These rights fall within the classic liberal tradition".
10 Walter S. Tamopolsky & William F. Pentney, Discrimination and the Law: Including
Equality Rights Under the Charter, looseleaf (Scarborough: Carswell, 2001) at 4-102.11-12.
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The Tribunal in Nixon, discussed in more detail below, rejected such a view,
while the British Columbia Supreme Court accepted it as governed by
precedent.
II. THE COMPLAINT AGAINST VANCOUVER RAPE RELIEF
The complaint initiated by Ms. Nixon forms part of a broader issue of whether
male to female transsexual persons have a human right of access to women's
groups, and in particular rape crises centres and women's shelters. Vancouver
Rape Relief and Women's Shelter (Rape Relief) describes itself as a volunteer
feminist collective organized in the fight to end violence against women. It
was formed in 1973 as a non-profit organization to respond to the needs of
women in crisis. It operates a 24-hour rape crisis line and a transition house
for battered women, providing peer counselling, support groups and
information to women who have been assaulted. It offers accompaniment and
advocacy through the medical, legal and social services systems that many
women must negotiate after a violent attack. Rape Relief believes that to end
women's oppression and to eliminate violence against women, women need to
join together and fight back collectively, becoming a democratic force.
Therefore, Rape Relief actively participates in the women's equality
movement.
Ms. Nixon is "a post-operative male to female transsexual. Her birth
certificate has been amended pursuant to s. 27(1) of the Vital Statistics Act"
... and records her gender as female."'12 She complained that Rape Relief had
discriminated against her, on the basis of sex, 13 by denying her a service
(framed as the opportunity for her to train to volunteer at Rape Relief) or
refusing to employ her. Rape Relief, a women-only group,' 4 took the position
that it excludes people who do not have the "life experience of being treated
" R.S.B.C. 1996, c.479.
12 Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 1.
13 In Vancouver Rape Relief Society v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)
(2000), 75 C.R.R. (2d) 173, 2000 BCSC 889, it was held in obiter that the ground "sex"
includes discrimination on the ground of transsexualism. See paras. 45-59 and in particular
para. 59: "I am accordingly of the opinion that the prohibition against discrimination on the
basis of 'sex' in the 1984 Act and the present Code includes a prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of transsexualism." While Ms. findlay, in "Real Women", supra note 4 at 61,
characterizes Rape Reliefs position as being that "no transgendered people - not even
transsexuals - are entitled to protection under the [Human Rights] Code", this case simply dealt
with the meaning of sex as a ground.
14 Approved as such under the human rights legislation in force in 1977. It is common
ground in the case that Rape Relief appropriately excludes men, and it was argued by Ms.




exclusively as [girls and women]" and do not "share... the life experience of
being assigned the historically subordinate status assigned to women in our
society."' 5
Tribunal member Heather MacNaughton found that Rape Relief was in
breach of the Human Rights Code16 in refusing to allow a person without the
life experience of being treated as a woman to train as a volunteer peer
counsellor at a women-only rape crisis centre and women's shelter, and
ordered Rape Relief to pay $7,500 to the complainant for injury to feelings.
The following summary sets out the position of the Tribunal along with an
indication of the subsequent history of each point.
1. The Tribunal held that the complaint fell within its jurisdiction under the
Code because, in the circumstances of the case, the opportunity to
volunteer falls within the meaning of "employment" and the training
program designed to equip women to assist victims of male violence is a
service to those participating in the training program. No judicial review
was sought of these rulings.
2. There was a prima facie case of discrimination. This was overturned on
judicial review.
3. While Rape Relief acted on a good faith standard which was rationally
connected to the goal of providing a safe and supportive environment for
women who seek its services, it had not met the burden of proof of
showing that the standard of life experience as a woman or girl is
reasonably necessary to be of assistance to its callers. The ruling on
reasonable necessity was challenged on review but was not addressed by
the court.
4. Rape Relief was not protected by s. 41 of the Code (which allows groups
with a primary purpose of promoting the interests or welfare of an
identifiable group characterized by sex or political belief to grant
preference to members of that group) for reasons having to do with the
findings of the Tribunal with respect to the Society's Objects, policies and
screening process. On judicial review the court held that Rape Relief was
protected by s. 41.
15 See Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 182.
16 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, as amended [Code]. Amendments relating to the Human Rights
Commission, but not affecting substantive protections, were proclaimed in force 31 March
2003. See Human Rights Amendment Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 62.
17 The author takes issue with the broad characterization of the decision in "Real Women".
Compare findlay, "Real Women", supra note 4 at 57. Given the factual elements of the decision
on whether Rape Relief was protected by the group rights in s. 41, it does not reflect a broad




There are thus a number of interesting and important issues in the case,
which relate to accommodating the rights of individuals and groups to self-
define. In particular, the scope of provisions protecting group rights is very
significant, and one which the author intends to address in a further article.
However, especially given the fact that not all human rights legislation has
protection for groups similar to that in s. 41, the focus of this paper is on point
2, the meaning of discrimination."8
III. THE MEANING OF DISCRIMINATION: THE CHARTER
The Charter includes a right to equality - to be free from discrimination.
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that
are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability.
The extensive, and evolving, constitutional jurisprudence on the meaning
of s. 15 generally reflects an understanding of equality which at least claims to
be substantive, and focused on the experience of disadvantage in the world,
rather than a liberal understanding of equality focusing on mere distinctions. 9
Thus, at the constitutional level, it could not be assumed that distinctions
between transsexual persons and persons with the life experience of being
treated as girls and women is even primafacie discrimination. The application
of the anti-discrimination norm would require a contextual analysis, governed
by Law. Law does not create any dramatic change in Canadian equality law,
but reflects the principle established in the famous case of Law Society of
British Columbia v. Andrews2" that a distinction is not necessarily
discrimination, as quoted by lacobucci J., for the Court:
18 While the author takes the position that one of the benefits of applying Law to the
human rights concept of discrimination is a contextual analysis that leaves space for argument
about equality-seeking respondents, the question of the legal meaning of discrimination can be
addressed without expressing a view on the merits of the application of that concept to the facts
of the Nixon case itself.
19 For a useful summary, see Mary C. Hurley, Charter Equality Rights: Interpretation of
Section 15 in Supreme Court of Canada Decisions (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Research
Branch, 1995).
20 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Andrews].
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A discriminatory burden or denial of a benefit, McIntyre J. stated [in Andrews, at
paras. 43-45], is to be understood in a substantive sense and in the context of the
historical development of Canadian anti-discrimination law, notably the human
rights codes: "The words 'without discrimination'...are a form of qualifier built
into s.15 itself and limit those distinctions which are forbidden by the section to
those which involve prejudice or disadvantage". 2'
Law makes it clear that the constitutional meaning of discrimination goes
beyond mere distinctions, even if it is open to criticism that it does not
robustly reflect substantive equality. In this paper it is referred to as reflecting
a substantive approach in the sense that it leaves room for argument that
particular distinctions reflect equality rather than discrimination. The case sets
out a three-step test:
1. Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant
and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail
to take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position within
Canadian society resulting in substantively differential treatment between
the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal
characteristics?
22
2. Is the claimant subject to differential treatment on the basis of one or more
enumerated and analogous grounds?
3. Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or
withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or
which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that
the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human
being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern,
respect, and consideration?
23
The overall purpose of s.15 is to prevent the violation of human dignity,
which is currently a key concept capturing the difference between a formal
and a substantive approach. Thus the Court states:
It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping,
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society,
21 Law, supra note 2 at para. 27.
22 Whether there is a distinction or not may be a complex issue in cases involving groups
or targeted programs. For instance, is a male to female transsexual, denied the opportunity to
volunteer at a women's shelter, treated differently than those women eligible to volunteer, or
the same as all others (including men, and women who do not share the political understanding
underlying the work of the women's shelter in question)?
23 Law, supra note 2 at para. 88.
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equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.
Legislation which effects differential treatment between individuals or groups will
violate this fundamental purpose where those who are subject to differential
treatment fall within one or more enumerated or analogous grounds, and where the
differential treatment reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group or
personal characteristics, or otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting
the view that the individual is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value
as a human being or as a member of Canadian society. Alternatively, differential
treatment will not likely constitute discrimination within the purpose of s. 15(1)
where it does not violate the human dignity or freedom of a person or group in this
way, and in particular where the differential treatment also assists in ameliorating
the position of the disadvantaged within Canadian society.24
Law arose in relation to denial of survivor's benefits under the Canada
Pension Plan on the basis of age. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the
age distinction does not violate the human dignity of younger persons or
suggest they are of less value as human beings. In the view of the Court,
younger persons are not stereotyped, as the law is functioning not by the
device of stereotype but by distinctions corresponding to the actual situation
of individuals. The focus was on those whose need was greatest, a goal
consistent with equality:
The differential treatment does not reflect or promote the notion that [young
people] are less capable or less deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.
Nor does the differential treatment perpetuate the view that people in this class are
less capable or less worthy of recognition or value as human beings or as members
of Canadian society. 5
Furthermore, the unanimous Court said that "Parliament is entitled ... to
premise remedial legislation upon informed generalizations without running
afoul of s. 15(1) of the Charter and being required to justify its position under
S. 1r.26
24 Ibid. at para. 51.
25 Ibid. at para. 102.
26 Ibid. at para. 106. For comment, see Greschner, supra note 8, who argues that Law does
advance the cause of substantive equality. She argues that the goal of s. 15 is substantive
equality: it takes into account opportunities, resources and choices within a society/community.
Because the Law approach identifies substantive violations of equality rights in the third step, it
promotes the overall goal of s. 15. The previous two-step approach implicitly defines equality
as 'sameness' with any deviation requiring justification. This formalistic approach is
inconsistent with the s. 15 goal of promoting substantive equality. However, Greschner goes on
to argue that Law needs to be extended; the Court should explicitly reject formalism and the
,relevancy' approach from the Egan trilogy. The Court should also reconsider 'essential human
dignity' as the core interest protected by equality rights. See also Daniel Proulx, "Les droits A
l'dgalitd revus et corrig6s par la Cour supreme du Canada dans l'arr~t Law: un pas en avant ou
un pas en arri~re?" (2001) 61 R. du B. 185; Beverly Baines, "Law v. Canada: Formatting
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Law was applied in the later case of Lovelace v. Ontario.27 It involved a
claim by aboriginal people not registered as bands, that their exclusion from
an agreement concerning casino proceeds between Ontario and aboriginal
people registered as bands was discrimination. It was held that this was not
discrimination as the agreement did not stereotype the claimants, there was a
fit with the actual situation of the individuals affected and the exclusion did
not undermine the ameliorative purpose of the program. While the claimants'
needs corresponded to the needs addressed by the casino program, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that more than a common need is required. The
claimants had very different relations to land, government and gaming. The
program was targeted at ameliorating the conditions of a specific
disadvantaged group, and a targeted program is less likely to be associated
with stereotyping or stigmatization.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the program in Lovelace is
consistent with s. 15, and the exclusion of the claimants was not discrimination
as it was not associated with a misconception of their needs, capacities and
circumstances. The Court came to that conclusion even though the two groups
have overlapping and largely shared histories of discrimination, poverty and
systemic disadvantage, which cry out for improvement. The project supported
the journey of the bands toward empowerment, dignity and self-reliance, and
while it was not designed to meet similar needs in the other aboriginal
communities, its failure was held not to amount to discrimination. It was held
that the appellants had failed to demonstrate, viewed from the perspective of
the reasonable individual, that the exclusion from the First Nations Fund had
the effect of demeaning the appellants' human dignity.
Law and Lovelace make clear, at the constitutional level, that a purposive
and contextual approach is required, given the strong remedial purpose of
s. 15(1) of the Charter, (echoed in the stated purposes of human rights
legislation), and to avoid the pitfalls of a formalistic approach. This approach
requires claims of discrimination on particular grounds to be given their own
distinctive analysis. As an example of such an approach in a context related to
gender, Law cites Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General),28 as illustrating
that the larger historical, biological and sociological contexts (of violence)
make some gender-based distinctions (in that case between men and women,
and having to do with strip searches in prison) non-discriminatory. This
approach can be contrasted to a formal equality approach which treats the
experiences of men and women as the same, and, with respect to women,
Equality" (2000) 11 Const. Forum Const. 65; Sheilah Martin, "Balancing Individual Rights to
Equality and Social Goals" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299.
27 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 2000 SCC 37 [Lovelace].
28 [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 210.
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treats the experiences of male to female transsexuals, lesbians and women of
colour as the same, thus making diversity invisible.29
Further, the approach involves a focus on what the Supreme Court of
Canada currently views as the core value protected by the anti-discrimination
norm, that of dignity, which is harmed by the imposition of disadvantage and
stereotyping. It is not enough "simply to assert, without more, that his or her
dignity has been adversely affected".3" This focus would permit an argument,
were a male to female transsexual to challenge legislation, or a government
program, that the life experience distinction did not involve harm to dignity or
stereotyping. Some transsexual persons and some women's groups may
disagree about the political and therapeutic significance of experience of being
treated as male. The constitutional approach at least allows an argument that
such disagreement over targeting programs to people with the life experience
of being treated as female is consistent with the human dignity of everyone
involved.
A. THE PERSPECTIVE ON DIGNITY
The test of whether dignity has been harmed is both subjective and objective. 3'
It is therefore necessary to look at the context from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the circumstances of a claimant. Who is this reasonable
person? It can now be argued that the reasonable person is one who shares the
values in the Charter, which includes the values of equality, privacy, security
of the person, freedom of association and freedom of thought and expression.
For example, in R. v. R.D.S.,32 L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. (La Forest
and Gonthier JJ. concurring) stated that the "reasonable person [in the context
of assessing bias] is an informed and right-minded member of the community,
a community which, in Canada, supports the fundamental principles [of the
Charter]".33 Similarly, in Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada et
al v. Corbire et al 34 L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (Gonthier, lacobucci and Binnie JJ.,
concurring) stated:
I would emphasize that the "reasonable person" considered by the subjective -
objective perspective understands and recognizes not only the circumstances of
29 For some discussion of "false parallelism", see Constance Backhouse, "Bias in Canadian
Law: A Lopsided Precipice" (1998) 10 C.J.W.L. 170 at 174-75.
30 Law, supra note 2 at para. 59.
31 Ibid. at para. 88.
32 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 161 N.S.R. (2d) 214.
33 Ibid. at para. 46.
34 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, 173 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [Corbi~re].
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those like him or her, but also appreciates the situation of others. Therefore, when
legislation impacts on various groups, particularly if those groups are
disadvantaged, the subjective-objective perspective will take into account the
particular experiences and needs of all of those groups.
35
Attention to dignity seems particularly important in a case of a group, or
targeted program, which excludes others apart from the claimant. A formal,
rather than a substantive approach, makes groupness per se discriminatory (at
least in the primafacie sense), a position that would obviously make women's
(and other) equality-seeking groups vulnerable to human rights complaints.
Applying Law and Lovelace, it can be argued that a reasonable person would
take into account the needs of disadvantaged groups to understand their own
experience and to organize on that basis, as well as the fact that others are
excluded from a particular group. Thus in Nixon, the complainant shared with
the majority of British Columbians the lack of opportunity to volunteer at
Rape Relief. She fell into a group which included men, pro-life women,
women who do not agree that women should be free to love whom they will,
women who are not willing to work against racism, and women with other
political differences with Rape Relief. There is no reason to suppose that all,
or even many, of these people do not support Rape Reliefs right to define
itself, and see their exclusion from this particular group as consistent with
their human dignity.
The reasonable person should rationally take into account the open-ended
list of contextual factors in Law.36 All of these leave space for argument that
the requirement of life-long experience of being treated as a girl and woman is
not a discriminatory qualification for training as a volunteer at a rape crisis
centre and women's shelter.
B. THE CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
1. PRE-EXISTING DISADVANTAGE
A pre-existing disadvantage in a group is not conclusive concerning whether a
distinction is "discrimination". Lovelace states that this factor does not require
35 Ibid. at para. 65 [emphasis in original]. While Corbi~re held that a restriction of voting
rights to aboriginal band members ordinarily resident on a reserve was contrary to s. 15, there
are significant differences between it and Nixon. For example, aboriginals resident off a reserve
have important financial, cultural and political interests in common with persons resident on a
reserve. Nevertheless, Corbiare supports the view that distinctions between off and on reserve
aboriginal persons are not discriminatory per se. See para. 23, which contemplates balancing
the rights of both sets of band members, and para. 74, which states that a purely local voting
system would not violate the right to equality.
36 Law, supra note 2 at para. 62 et seq.
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claimants to engage in a "race to the bottom". 37 There, the Supreme Court of
Canada acknowledged "the disadvantages suffered both by the claimants
[non-band aboriginals] and the comparator group [band aboriginals]". The
Court said:
In short, beyond the unseemly nature of the relative disadvantage approach ... its
narrow focus is inconsistent with the fullness of the substantive equality analysis
... [and]
[Wihile it is often true that distinctions may produce discrimination, there are
many other situations where substantive equality requires that distinctions be made
in order to take into account the actual circumstances of individuals as they are
located in varying social, political and economic situations.
38
It can be argued that the disadvantages suffered by a male to female
transsexual (or transgendered persons in general), are different in nature from
those suffered by persons who have been treated as women all or most of their
lives (all forms of disadvantaged treatment deserving their own distinctive
analysis). At the time such a person was growing up being treated as male, a
social experience simply demonstrated by the fact that it is possible for such
an experience to be meaningfully spoken or written, other people were
growing up being treated as female. This was reflected in evidence called by
both the complainant and respondent in the Nixon case itself. For instance, Dr.
Ross, a sociologist called by the complainant, testified about the "enormous
pressure on individuals, almost from birth, to conform to society's view of
what is acceptable male or female behaviour. '39 Thus, while the complainant
was experiencing pressure to conform to societal expectations of the male
gender, girls were experiencing pressure to conform to societal expectations of
the female gender. Law leaves space for respect for different forms of
disadvantage, including recognition of the fact that growing up as a girl is an
experience, obviously a varied one, but nevertheless an experience that can be
the subject of research, conversation, and judicial notice.
More fundamentally, the conflation of growing up being treated as
male/female casts doubt on whether girls and women exist at all, including as
subjects of, and actors in, a political movement such as the women's
37 See also Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2003), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 1,
2003 SCC 34 [Trociuk], in which the Court stated, at para. 20, that while historical
disadvantage is probably the most compelling factor, "it is settled law that neither the presence
or absence of any of the contextual factors set out in Law is dispositive of a s. 15(1) claim ...
because no single factor can determine, in all circumstances, whether a reasonable claimant
would perceive that an impugned distinction infringes his or her dignity".
38 Lovelace, supra note 27 at paras. 59-60.
39 Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 135.
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movement. It rejects, at least at the finding of discrimination stage, the
freedom of individuals and groups to organize around their own understanding
of oppression, even if they cannot, on a literal level, point to one defining
biological factor, such as menstruation or pregnancy, or social experience,
such as being paid less than men, being particularly vulnerable to sexual
assault, or lacking credibility when called as a witness in a legal proceeding.
Similarly, it would not be possible to prove that there is such a thing as
race, or one defining experience of racism, but that does not mean that racism
does not exist or that law should not respect racialized persons' own
understanding of their experiences.4" Thus it should at least be arguable that it
is not discrimination for people of colour to define themselves in various
ways, including on the basis of a lifetime experience of being visibly
identifiable as a minority person. A substantive analysis has the potential to
include analysis both of race as a harmful social construct, and the equality-
promoting effects of the use of racial groupings to fight racism.
As well, it is distinctive to the experience of being transgendered that there
is an on-going debate about the most appropriate approach to eradicating
disadvantage, for example, with respect to the ethics of sex reassignment
surgery.4 However, Lovelace encourages the avoidance of an "unseemly"
argument about the relative disadvantage of women who grew up being
treated as girls and women, and people whose gender identity has always been
female but who have lived being treated as boys and men.
40 See e.g. Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Canada 1900-1950
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) ("'Race' is a mythical construct. 'Racism' is not"
at 7).
41 See e.g. Pat Califia, Sex Changes: The Politics of Transgenderism (San Francisco: Cleis
Press, 1997) at 245-47:
Until the latter part of this decade, transsexual activism focused on gaining social
acceptance for post-reassignment transsexuals... More recently, transgendered
activists have been questioning the entire system of binary and polarized gender.
Some leaders ... have called for transsexuals to direct their political efforts toward
eliminating the notions of 'men' and 'women', rather than working to be perceived by
nontranssexuals as a member of either gender. This has coincided with an increase in
the numbers of people who label themselves as third gender, two-spirit ...
One of the most visible and articulate proponents of this view is Kate Bornstein. In
her book Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us, (New York:
Routledge, 1994 at p.8] Bornstein labels her own gender as follows: 'I know I'm not a
man - about that much I'm very clear, and I've come to the conclusion that I'm
probably not a woman either, at least not according to a lot of people's rules on this
sort of thing. The trouble is, we're living in a world that insists we be one or the other
- a world that doesn't bother to tell us exactly what one or the other is'.
In Bornstein's opinion, transgendered people are not born into the wrong bodies; they




Law analyses "correspondence" as the relationship between the ground of
discrimination and the characteristics or circumstances of the included and
excluded groups. Lovelace expresses this factor as correspondence to needs,
capacities, and circumstances. So this can be conveniently referred to as the
"correspondence factor". Both cases say that where there is a high level of
correspondence, the distinction is unlikely to be "discrimination".
With respect to the issue of whether it is discrimination for women's
groups to exclude male to female transsexuals, it can be argued that the level
of correspondence is high. Attention to life experience is attention to
capacities and circumstances. Needs are more complex. If the need of a
particular transgendered person is to help victims of male violence, it may be
possible to meet that need without neglecting the needs of those victims. For
example, women's groups can have structures which allow all supporters to
help them in particular ways, such as by fund-raising. If the need of a
particular individual is validation as a woman without distinction as to life
experience, a need that might be described as a need for formal equality, then
some rape crises centres and women's shelters are arguably not in a position
to meet that need consistent with the needs of their service users and political
objectives.
In Lovelace, the Court accepted that the different aboriginal communities
face the same social problems and have the same needs, but despite that, held
that there was not "discrimination". More than a common need is required. It
must be possible to target programs by paying attention to the unique
circumstances and capabilities of potential program beneficiaries.42
3. AMELIORATIVE PURPOSE OR EFFECTS
Where the exclusion relates to the ameliorative purpose or effects, it is
unlikely to be "discrimination." This factor does not focus on "a simplistic
measuring or balancing of relative disadvantage" or on the fact that, as in
Lovelace, the two groups are equally disadvantaged. Instead, the focus is on
the fact that a program is "targeted at ameliorating the conditions of a specific
disadvantaged group rather than at disadvantage potentially experienced by
any member of society." The Court also held that "exclusion from a targeted
... program [consistent with the equality goals of s. 15] is less likely to be
associated with stereotyping or stigmatization or conveying the message that
the excluded group is less worthy of recognition and participation in the larger
society.
43
42 Lovelace, supra note 27 at para. 75.
43 Ibid. at paras. 85-86.
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It can be argued that requiring volunteer trainees at women's shelters to
have the life experience of being treated as girls and women is not associated
with stereotyping or conveying the message that the excluded group is less
worthy of recognition and participation in the larger society. For instance,
women's groups may also exclude men from participation, not because they
are thought to lack personal empathy or to have any other negative
characteristics, but because they are not peers to people who have grown up
with the life experience of the social subordination of women.
4. NATURE OF INTEREST AFFECTED
The Supreme Court of Canada cases require a consideration of the nature of
the interests affected, both the claimant's and others', in considering whether
the distinction amounts to "discrimination". Does the exclusion restrict access
to a fundamental social institution, affect a basic aspect of full membership in
Canadian society, or constitute complete non-recognition of a particular
group?
Again, it can be argued that the inability to volunteer at a particular
women's group does not affect a fundamental interest. The ability to volunteer
does not affect the meaning of membership in Canadian society, nor does it
constitute complete non-recognition of a particular group. In contrast, the
nature of the interest affected for women seeking help from rape crises centres
and women's shelters includes equality, privacy and security of the person,
and for both callers and staff and volunteers, freedom of association.
The broader the interests protected by human rights legislation, the weaker
the interests affected may become for complainants. Thus, if employment is
construed to include volunteering and service is construed to include the
opportunity to help others as a service to oneself; the claim that a basic aspect
of membership of society is affected becomes more tenuous.
The contextual approach, as set out in Law, requires all these factors to be
considered. In Nixon, the Tribunal held that the Law approach did not apply
but then went on to consider the issue of dignity in any event, holding that the
her exclusion from the volunteer training program was inconsistent with Ms.
Nixon's dignity. The court found both conclusions to be in error. The rejection
of the Law approach was incorrect in light of a decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Reaney, discussed below. Further, the court held
that the Tribunal was unreasonable in finding an impact on dignity - exclusion
from a small, self-defined identifiable group cannot, on the basis of objective
scrutiny, impact negatively on the dignity of any person excluded. This is
particularly so where it is "imperative that membership requirements become
more standardized so legitimate (membership claimants) can be identified"."
44 Vancouver Rape Relief, supra note 5 at para. 146 (here the court was quoting from
R.v.Powley (2003), 203 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2003 SCC 43, in its discussion of Mdtis membership).
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The court took the view that legislated exclusions are more likely to have a
negative impact on dignity than exclusion from self-defining organizations,
persons not included within the membership of groups have the same rights as
most people, and case law suggests that it is not the function of the Code
to provide a referee with authority to impose state-sanctioned penalties in political
disputes between private organizations established to promote the interests of self-
defined 'identifiable groups' and their members or prospective members.
45
C. SECTIONS 15(2) AND 1
An argument could be made that the elaborate analysis set out above is out of
place under s. 15(1) given the existence of both ss. 15(2) and 1 of the Charter.
A similar argument can also be anticipated with respect to the human rights
meaning of discrimination, especially given the existence of defences. There
are several responses. First, the Law analysis does not track affirmative action
analysis, even if it is animated by similar values, thus leaving at least the
theoretical possibility that s. 15(2) has a role to play other than as an
interpretative confirmation of s. 15(1).46 It seems clear, however, that s. 15(2)
should rarely, if ever, be needed. Second, Lovelace addresses the inter-
relationship of the two sub-sections, providing strong support for the view that
s. 15(2) is confirmatory, supplementary, and of interpretative assistance to s.
15(1), thus ensuring the internal coherence of the Charter as a working
statute.47 However, the Court contemplated the possibility of reconsideration
of this matter.48
Nevertheless, it is now clear that, on the constitutional level, targeting a
program at a particular group (in other words, a lack of inclusiveness per se)
does not automatically make programs discriminatory, even on the primafacie
level. And this is true even if people who experience disadvantage are
excluded. The Law approach, whether or not it is an ideal reflection of
substantive equality, gives a great deal of scope for a nuanced analysis very
different from a formal equality approach. This is discussed further after the
meaning of discrimination in the human rights context has been explored.
45 Vancouver Rape Relief, supra note 5 at para. 157.
46 See Lovelace, supra note 27at para. 100.
47 Ibid. at paras. 93 -108. The Court noted at the time the Charter was drafted there was a
worry that affirmative action programs would be overturned on the basis of reverse
discrimination. The concern expressed in this paper is that that worry has not been dispelled in
the human rights context.
48 Ibid. at para. 108.
VOL. 37:1
THE ANTI-DICRIMINATION NORM
IV. THE MEANING OF DISCRIMINATION - HUMAN RIGHTS
LEGISLATION
Turning to the human rights context, it is clear that some provincial
legislatures, courts and human rights bodies are only beginning to grapple
with the implications of substantive equality for human rights. When one
looks at human rights adjudication, it appears that while human rights law is
somewhat attentive to substantive equality in an overall sense, with respect to
the meaning of discrimination, there is a preference for what I would suggest
is formal equality. Human rights bodies routinely jump from the finding of a
distinction to a prima facie finding of discrimination. This is so even though
the structure of human rights legislation is generally very similar to the
Charter.
Charter Human rights legislation (BC)
1. s. 15(1) equality (informed by affirmative action) non-discrimination
2. s. 1 limitations bona fide exceptions
3. s. 15(2) affirmative action affirmative action type defences
This routine jump also happens even though well-known case law supports
the proposition that human rights legislation and s. 15 of the Charter should
be construed consistently. McIntyre J. referred to the interpretation and
application of s. 15 of the Charter in Andrews. Speaking for the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada, he said that, in general, "it may be said that the
principles which have been applied under the human rights Acts are equally
applicable in considering questions of discrimination under section 15(1) [of
the Charter].' '49 Similarly, in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,50 Dickson
C.J.C., for the Supreme Court, although considering whether a disability plan
was discriminatory under the Manitoba Human Rights legislation, expressly
relied upon the definition found in Charter jurisprudence:
What does discrimination mean? The most recent pronouncement on this point
will be found in the judgment of my colleague, McIntyre, J., in Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia ...51
Nevertheless, it appears to have been assumed that the Law analysis does not
apply to the human rights field, an assumption that is now called into question
by a number of court decisions which are discussed below.
The preference for formal equality does not appear to have been explicitly
based on the legislative wording. The drafting of provincial and federal human
49 Andrews, supra note 20 at para. 38.
50 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [Brooks].
51 Ibid. at para. 22.
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rights legislation varies, thus leaving more or less room for argument about
the applicability of Law depending on the jurisdiction. One can compare
British Columbia, Alberta, Canada and Ontario by way of illustration.
In British Columbia, for instance, s. 13(1) of the Code states that a person
must not:
(a) refuse to employ a person .... or
(b) discriminate against a person regarding employment ... because of the ... sex
... of that person ...
Section 1 of the Code says "'discrimination' includes the conduct described in
section 7, 8(1)(a), 9(a) or (b), 10(1)(a), 11, 13(1)(a) or (2), 14(a) or (b) or 43".
There are defences of bona fide occupational requirement or justification,
group exemption and affirmative action programs.
The wording is very similar in Alberta's Human Rights, Citizenship and
Multiculturalism Act. 52 However, the Alberta version of bona fide defences
can be found in s. 11, which contains a provision similar to s. 1 of the Charter
in that it says that a "contravention of this Act shall be deemed not to have
occurred if the person who is alleged to have contravened the Act shows that
the alleged contravention was reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances."
The wording of the Canadian Human Rights Act 5 3 is somewhat similar,
albeit against a background of a purpose, set out in s. 2, which uses the term
equal and refers to obligations.
The purpose of this Act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect ... to the
principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other
individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have
and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations
as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by
discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction
for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.
Section 5 states, for example:
It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or
accommodation customarily available to the general public
(a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service, facility or
accommodation to any individual, or
52 R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14, s. 7.
53 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
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(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual, on a prohibited ground
of discrimination.
In contrast, in the Ontario Human Rights Code,5 4 the wording much more
clearly suggests consistency with the constitutional jurisprudence. For
instance, s. 1 says:
Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and
facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour,
ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, same-
sex partnership status, family status or disability.
Furthermore, in s. 10, "'equal' means subject to all requirements,
qualifications and considerations that are not a prohibited ground of
discrimination". Section 14(1) is similar to s. 15(2) of the Charter.
A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special program
designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged
persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal opportunity or that is
likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part I.
Provisions allowing for bona fide occupational requirements are also
included."
While wording varies, human rights adjudicative bodies commonly ask
whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination, rather than use the
precise legislative wording to pose the question.56 Indeed, this is consistent
with the interpretive approach required by the Supreme Court of Canada. 7
Thus in Nixon, the Tribunal asked if there was a prima facie case of
discrimination, rather than whether the complainant had been refused
employment or a service "because" of sex.58
54 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.
55 See e.g. ibid., ss. 17, 18, 24.
56 In order for a complainant to establish a prima facie case, there must be evidence on the
basis of which the Tribunal could decide that there was discrimination. In Ontario (Human
Rights Comm.) and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at para. 28, 23 D.L.R.
(4th) 321, the Court described a primafacie case as "one which covers the allegations made and
which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the absence of an
answer from the [respondent]".
57 See University of British Columbia v. Berg, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 353 at para. 32, 102 D.L.R.
(4th) 665, cited in Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571 at para. 6, 133
D.L.R. (4th) 449: "If human rights legislation is to be interpreted in a purposive manner,
differences in wording between provinces should not obscure the essentially similar purposes of
such provisions, unless the wording clearly evinces a different purpose on behalf of a particular
provincial legislature".
58 Were the question to be asked in a way that tracks the wording of the Code then the
word "because" would need to bear the burden of the Law analysis.
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This is typical in that decisions tend to refer simply to a primafacie case of
discrimination, without referring to human dignity analysis, as the Tribunal
pointed out in Nixon:
[t]he Court's conclusion in Meiorin,59 that the claimant had discharged the burden
of establishing a prima facie case, makes no mention of human dignity. Rather, the
Court simply says that the arbitrator held that, because of their generally lower
aerobic capacity, most women are adversely affected by the high aerobic standard
at issue. The burden then shifted to the respondent to demonstrate that the aerobic
standard set was a bona fide occupational requirement ... . In Grismer,60 the Court
applied its new unified approach in a case involving the delivery of public services
and said that the new test applied to all claims of discrimination under the Code....
Again, the Court made no mention of the s. 15(1) analysis or human dignity in
concluding that the complainant had established a prima facie case of
discrimination. It simply said that Mr. Grismer had established a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing that he was denied a licence that was available to
others based on a physical disability.
61
A relevant illustration of this more formal (in the sense that it does not
involve a contextual analysis) approach can be found in Kavanagh and
Canadian Human Rights Commission and Attorney General of Canada and
the Zenith Foundation and Trans/Action.62 An issue in Kavanagh was whether
placing pre-operative transsexual inmates in prisons corresponding to their
anatomical sex was contrary to the Canadian human rights legislation. It was
held, and indeed conceded, that since other inmates were placed in accordance
with both their anatomical sex and gender, this was prima facie
discriminatory, thus placing the burden on the Correctional Service of Canada
to prove a bonafide justification. The justification was accepted on the basis
of the difficulties placement in a target gender institution would pose for
women inmates, "a vulnerable group, who are entitled to have their needs
recognized and respected. '63 However, it was assumed without analysis that a
difference had to be justified rather than analysed to see if it were
discriminatory at all.
59 British Columbia (Public Service Relations Committee) v. British Columbia Government
and Service Employees' Union, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 69-70, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
60 British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of
Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 at paras. 19, 23, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
61 Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 116.
62 Kavanagh v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] C.H.R.D. No. 21, 41 C.H.R.R. D/119
(CHRT) [Kavanagh].
63 Ibid. at para. 158 (Interestingly, Ms. Nixon argued in the Supreme Court that Rape
Relief could exclude pre-operative persons: Vancouver Rape Relief, supra note 5 at para. 43).
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Nevertheless, not all human rights adjudicators adopt this approach. A
striking illustration is from a somewhat similar case, involving a challenge to
a women-only newspaper, Keyes v. Pandora Publishing Ltd.64 This case
involved a complaint by Gene Keyes against Pandora Publishing Association,
a women-only group that published a newspaper, Pandora, for, by and about
women. Keyes had a particular interest in the issue of custody. He had been
involved in protracted legal proceedings respecting custody of, and access to,
his children, and was not satisfied with the results of those proceedings. He
wanted Pandora to publish a letter on the subject and was advised that under
no circumstances would his letter be published because he was a man. Keyes
then complained to the Human Rights Commission that he had been
discriminated against because of his sex.65
The Board of Inquiry addressed the question of the meaning of
discrimination and whether the human rights meaning should be consistent
with s. 15, by referring to Andrews, quoting as follows:
It must be recognized, however, as well that the promotion of equality under s. 15
has a much more specific goal than the mere elimination of distinctions. If the
Charter was intended to eliminate all distinctions, then there would be no place for
sections such as 27(multicultural heritage); 2(a) (freedom of conscience and
religion); 25(aboriginal rights and freedoms); and other such provisions designed
to safeguard certain distinctions. Moreover, the fact that identical treatment may
frequently produce serious inequality is recognized in s. 15(2), which states that
the equality rights in s. 15(1) do "not preclude any law, program or activity that
has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups ... 66
The Board noted that McIntyre J., in Andrews, was satisfied that "identical
treatment may frequently produce serious inequality. 67
The problem was that the wording of the legislation did not appear to give
the Board any interpretative leeway. Pandora argued that discrimination must
64 (1992), 16 C.H.R.R D/148 (NSHRBI) [Keyes].
65 The complaint was dealt with as one of discrimination against men in general. However,
the complainant also attempted, unsuccessfully, to claim discrimination against a disadvantaged
sub-group of men, that is, divorced and separated fathers claiming custody or access rights to
their children. It was suggested that even if Pandora could advantage women over men
generally in its letter writing policy, it could not advantage women over this alleged sub-group
of men claimed to have been discriminated against on the basis of sex. The Tribunal saw no
merit in this proposition, which was outside the scope of the inquiry, inconsistent with the
evidence, lacking in authority, doubtful in terms of whether the group was in fact
disadvantaged, and even if it were, this would not limit Pandora's right to prefer women in its
letters to the Editor policy.
66 Andrews, supra note 20 at para. 24, quoted in Keyes, supra note 64 at 156.
67 Ibid. at para. 26.
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be construed consistently with the Charter as a matter of law. While the Board
was conscious of the limitations in the application of the Charter to human
rights legislation, it did not see that those limitations applied when the issue
was the legal content of the prohibition against discrimination. In the Board's
opinion, the provisions of the [Nova Scotia Human Rights] Act must be
interpreted and applied so as to permit the making of distinctions between
classes of individuals if the distinction is part of an activity or programme that
has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups.68
The Board concluded:
Accordingly, I am satisfied that in law women may form single sex organizations
for the purpose of promoting equality. I am further satisfied as a general statement,
of the law, that such organizations may prefer or advantage women even if the
effect of that is to discriminate against men (as a group or individually) on the
basis of sex, without violating the anti-discrimination provisions of the Act.
69
In rejecting the complaint, the Board thus adopted an approach to
discrimination both influenced by the constitutional understanding that
affirmative action is consistent with equality and positive to equality-seeking
groups.70
A recent body of case law now provides support for the Keyes approach.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal in British Columbia Government and
Service Employees' Union v. British Columbia (Public Service Employee
Relations Commission),7' has now unanimously held that:
68 The Board appeared to find support for this conclusion in the fact that the Act had been
amended in various ways, including R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, as am. by S.N.S. 1991, c. 12, s. 6:
"Subsection (1) of Section 5 does not apply ... (i) to preclude a law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or classes of
individuals including those who are disadvantaged because of a characteristic referred to in
clauses (h) to (v) of subsection (I) of Section 5." In the Board's opinion, the amendments
brought the language of the Act into conformity with the Charter, but the Act was already
subject to the Charter in those respects.
69 Keyes, supra note 64 at 159. Further, the Board did not need to find that it absolutely
necessary for all women's newspapers to have a policy of excluding all material which was not
written by women in order for Pandora to justify its letter to the editor policy. It need only be a
policy that might reasonably be adopted in the circumstances. It stated at 160: "[R]easonable
women might take different views as to whether or not a women's newspaper should limit itself
to letters and articles written by women only. I can also accept that women might reasonably
conclude that such a policy is appropriate to one women's publication having regard to the
circumstances and objectives of that publication and that it is not appropriate to another having
regard to its circumstances and objectives".
70 For a more recent example, see Wignall v. Canada (Department of National Revenue
(Taxation)), [2001] C.H.R.D. No. 9.
71 (2002), 216 D.L.R. (4th) 322, 2002 BCCA 476 [Reaney].
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In my opinion, the same analytical framework [as that in Law governing whether
there has been a violation of s. 15 of the Charter] must govern the determination of
whether there has been a violation of s. 13 of the Human Rights Code of British
Columbia.72
The issue in Reaney was whether treating adopting mothers less generously
than biological mothers constitutes discrimination (on the ground of family
status) under s. 13 of the Human Rights Code. On appeal the arbitrator's
decision was overturned by the court, which applied a purposive analysis to
the leave provisions of the collective agreement, stating that the "precise
question in this appeal then is what is the purpose of the Maternity Leave and
Maternity Allowance provisions. 73
The court held that the difference between adopting and biological mothers
was not discriminatory because the purpose of the provisions
when seen in their context, is not the encouragement of family formation but,
rather, protecting the health and well being of pregnant women and new biological
mothers, (not simply new parents), while undergoing the health and other stresses
of giving birth and recovering from giving birth, so that they can effectively return
to the work force.74
Further, the court concluded, quoting Schacter v. Canada,7 5 that the
Supreme Court "has repeatedly stated that Parliament may constitutionally
attack one problem, or part of a problem, at a time. '76 Vancouver Rape Relief
follows Reaney in holding that the Law analysis applies.
The view of the British Columbia Court of Appeal also finds support in
several Alberta cases. In Gwinner v. Alberta (Human Resources and
Employment) 7 a government widows' pension scheme was challenged as
discriminatory on the basis of marital status under the Human Rights,
Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act.78 The court observed that the elaborate
third step scrutiny in Law will neither be necessary and appropriate in most
72 Ibid. at para. 12.
73 Ibid. at para. 16 [emphasis added].
74 Ibid. at para. 17.
75 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
76 Ibid. at para. 106, cited in Reaney, supra note 71 at para. 20.
77 (2002), 217 D.L.R. (4th) 341, 2002 ABQB 685 [Gwinner].
78 R.S.A. 2000, c. H-14 (this legislation has supremacy over other Alberta legislation.
Section 1(1) states that "[u]nless it is declared by an Act of the Legislature that it operates
notwithstanding this Act, every law of Alberta is inoperative to the extent that it authorizes or
requires the doing of anything prohibited by this Act").
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human rights cases, 79 and that human rights tribunals (including that in Nixon)
have resisted the application of the Law analysis. 80 Nevertheless, "it will be
appropriate in some cases to apply the entire Law analysis".8 ' Here there was a
serious question as to whether the dignity interest of the claimants was
engaged.2
Mis v. Alberta (Human Rights and Citizenship Commission)83 followed
Gwinner in applying the Law analysis to a pension scheme at the University of
Alberta, the court stating:
I am of the view that this analysis [of whether the distinction impacts on human
dignity] should apply not only to s. 15(1) of the Charter but also to Alberta's
human rights legislation, given that they both have a common intent.84
So where do we stand at the moment? In contrast to recent court decisions, it
appears that there is some reluctance among human rights adjudicators to
apply Law in the human rights field.
V. SHOULD DISCRIMINATION BE GIVEN A CONSISTENT
MEANING?
In many cases discrimination is obvious once a distinction is shown. In rare
cases, most strikingly in cases involving equality-seeking groups, or targeted
programs, it is not. All parties in Nixon agreed (without explanation as to why)
that one gender-based distinction (the exclusion of men) was permissible. The
complainant and respondent led consistent evidence that gender is not binary,
but rather falls on a continuum. Hence this case could have been seen as
raising the issue of whether a distinction, other than the binary male/female
distinction, is discriminatory. Similar issues can easily be imagined. Is it
79 Gwinner, supra note 77at para. 104.
80 Ibid. at paras. 104-05.
81 Ibid. at para. 103.
82 The court went on to conclude that the omission of the divorced and separated from the
pension scheme was discriminatory and not reasonable and justifiable, while the omission of the
single was discriminatory but reasonable and justifiable.
83 (2002), 10 Alta. L.R. (4th) 320, 2002 ABQB 570 [Mis].
84 Ibid. at ara. 70.
85 There are two possible forms that such discrimination could take. First, exclusion could
be discriminatory per se, no matter how the exclusion was identified and implemented. The
argument in the text relates to this form. Second, there could be discrimination in the manner
that an individual is excluded, even though the fact of excluding that individual is not
discriminatory. Sheridan v. Sanctuary Investments Ltd. (c.o.b. B.J.'s Lounge), [1999]
B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 43, 33 C.H.R.R. D/467 [Sheridan], addresses the manner of exclusion of
an individual, inter alia. In Sheridan, at para. 111, it was noted, "if any inquiries ... need to be
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discriminatory for a lesbian group to exclude bisexual persons? Is it
discriminatory for a group composed of people of colour, such as African-
Canadians, to exclude persons who are not visibly identifiable as African-
Canadians? Is it discriminatory for a group of aboriginals living on reserves to
exclude off-reserve aboriginals? 86 Or should such equality-seeking groups be
faced with a finding of prima facie discrimination and forced to bear the
burden of proof of defences?
87
made to verify that an individual is a transsexual in transition, such inquiries need to be made in
a dignified, private, and non-confrontational manner". Discrimination arising from the manner
of exclusion can in turn be analysed as having two potential components. First, there is the
question of whether any inquiry is discriminatory. Second, there is the question of whether the
style of communication is discriminatory. In Nixon, supra note 3, Rape Relief argued that,
given that it was common ground that men can be excluded, mere inquiry regarding an
individual's gender is not discrimination. There are some people who can legitimately be
excluded, in a context in which appearance would appropriately trigger inquiry. Further,
inquiries into the background of volunteers and employees is commonplace and appropriate in
society generally, especially for those seeking to work with children and other vulnerable
groups. Inquiry into experience does not impose a burden or disadvantage not imposed on
others, as contemplated by Andrews, supra note 20 at paras 37-39. Rape Relief also argued that
it met the standard set out in Sheridan (a case decided after the incident which was the subject
of the complaint) of using a dignified, private, and non-confrontational manner to ask the
complainant to leave.
86 A form of this issue arose in Corbidre, supra note 34. There the issue was whether s.
77(1) of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, violated the equality rights of s. 15. In particular did
the words "and is ordinarily resident on the reserve" discriminate against band members living
off reserve with respect to their voting rights? The Court delivered a unanimous decision to the
effect that the actual distinction in issue was discriminatory, but there were different reasons
given. However, both McLachlin C.C. in the majority of 5 and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in the
minority of 4 agreed that "aboriginality-residence" is an analogous ground to the enumerated
grounds in s. 15(1) and that the third step of the contextual approach is required to determine
whether the exclusion was in fact discriminatory. McLachlin C.J.C. made this clear at para. 10
by stating that after the ground of aboriginality-residence is established "the analysis moves to
the third stage: whether the distinction amounts, in purpose or effect, to discrimination on the
facts of the case." L'Heureux-Dub6 J. made a similar claim at para. 94: "The above analysis
also does not suggest that any distinction between on-reserve and off-reserve band members
would be stereotypical, interfere with off-reserve members' dignity, or conflict with the
purposes of s. 15(1). There are clearly important differences between on-reserve and off-reserve
band members, which Parliament could legitimately recognize." This it is clear that, depending
on context, non-discriminatory distinctions can be made between on and off reserve aboriginal
persons.
87 It is implicit in this argument that the interests of potential respondents should be taken
into account in framing and interpreting human rights law, and that such interests may be
equality-promoting. "A satisfactory rationale for discrimination law requires that the legitimate
interests of both constituencies - potential defendants and potential plaintiffs - be taken into




In Nixon, the complainant relied on the case law, such as Meiorin and
Grismer, discussed above, supporting the view that a distinction shows a
primafacie case of discrimination. The respondent drew on the constitutional
understanding of discrimination, such as that as reflected in Keyes (and now in
the recent case law), to argue that, while the right of the complainant to be free
of sex discrimination in all the many situations where gendered life experience
is irrelevant, such as shelter, education, and most employment and services,
should be recognized, in the rare case where gendered life experience is
relevant, drawing a distinction between women with the life experience of
being treated as women and male to female transsexual persons is not
discrimination.
The Tribunal Member devoted considerable attention to this issue in her
decision, although without coming to a very clear conclusion. While she
categorized the respondent's argument as suggesting a change in the elements
required of a prima facie case,88 she said that "[u]nquestionably, human rights
legislation and s. 15 ... are to be construed consistently. ' '89 Given that Law did
not change the Andrews approach, she took the view that it did not alter
"twenty years of jurisprudence under human rights legislation."9 What did
this jurisprudence establish? "There is no question that, in the human rights
context, a distinction per se does not amount to discrimination. A
contravention of the Code requires that a distinction is discriminatory ..."
Here the Tribunal quoted Barrett at al. V. Cominco at al.,9' in which Tribunal
Member Parrack said:
...the assessment of whether there is a disadvantage resulting in discrimination
requires consideration of the context in which the claim is made and a purposive
analysis to determine if the disadvantage results in discrimination in the
substantive sense.
Thus Nixon appears to adopt the Barrett approach of holding that
"discrimination under the Code requires a substantive analysis", as well as the
rejection of the applicability of the Law analysis to the human rights field.
Thus, the Tribunal did "not accept the ... argument ... that a violation of
human dignity is an independent and necessary element of a prima facie
88 Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 95.
89 Ibid. at para. 96.
90°Ibid. at para. I110.
91 [2001] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 46 at para. 96, cited in Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 112. See




case." 92 She based this on the fact that human rights decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada, such as Meiorin and Grismer, mentioned above, did not
embark on a dignity analysis (although later it is pointed out that presumably
in such cases discrimination in the substantive sense is evident),93 the
differences between human rights legislation and the Charter noted in
Andrews, 94 that a human rights respondent is not entitled to deference,95 that
defences exist which form part of the ultimate decision on discrimination, that
the nature of the interest affected (part of the contextual analysis) is taken into
account in the listing of protected spheres of activity, e.g. housing and
employment,96 and that individual complainants were not singled out for
invidious treatment in the recent s. 15(1) cases.97 Once the onus shifts to a
respondent to justify its conduct, then the impact on dignity "may" be
considered. 98
It is difficult to assess what view of discrimination is adopted in such cases
as Nixon and Barrett. It is said that human rights and s. 15 should be
consistent. The meaning of discrimination is established in the human rights
field in cases where discrimination in the substantive sense is evident, and yet
their approach would be changed by following Law. A distinction is not
discrimination, and yet an impact on dignity is not part of a prima facie case
(or indeed an essential part of the case overall). The approach is said to be
purposive and contextual, but in practice either a facial or effects distinction
will be enough for a primafacie case.
It seems that the constitutional approach, as reflected in current case law,
has been largely rejected as part of the concept of a primafacie case by human
rights adjudicators. While they may claim to take a contextual, purposive
approach, the approach in practice is formal rather than contextual. Such a
rejection of an actual contextual analysis presents a number of difficulties that
go beyond the obscurities of several Tribunal decisions.
92 Nixon, supra note 3 at para. 114 (nevertheless, she went on to consider the issue and
found, in obiter, that there was harm to the complainant's dignity).
93 Ibid. at para. 123.
94 Ibid. at para. 118 (These are that legislation applied to private activities, to a specific list
of prohibited grounds, has exemptions/defences compared to s. 1 of the Charter. However,
there is no analysis of why any of these points would explain why non-discriminatory
government action is legitimately labeled discriminatory when private).
95 Ibid. at para. 120.
96 Ibid. at para. 122.
97 Ibid. at para. 123.
98 Ibid. at para. 124.
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A. DOES INCONSISTENCY HAVE A DISPARATE IMPACT?
The tension in a case such as Nixon, where a member of a disadvantaged
group challenges a disadvantaged group is obvious. On the one hand, the
disadvantage of a complainant (the pre-existing disadvantage factor), which
has both an individual and group dimension,99 points in the direction of a
finding of discrimination; on the other, the disadvantage of the group women
with the life experience of being treated as women (the ameliorative purpose
factor), points in the opposite direction. Refusal to use a contextual analysis,
which takes such factors into account, makes a discrimination complaint
easier for all complainants (including men laying complaints against women's
groups), but has a negative impact on disadvantaged groups who seek to form
groups reflecting their understanding of their own oppression.
A true contextual approach to discrimination in human rights case would
permit analysis of the special and unusual aspect of group cases, since
groupness by definition requires insiders and outsiders. A more formal
approach treats groupness as per se discriminatory, with respondent groups
left to prove that they fit within some group exemption. This pits associational
rights against the non-discrimination norm, and tends to neglect the equality-
promoting role of some groups. A contextual approach is at least capable of
recognizing that groupness has inequality-reflecting and equality-promoting
aspects.
Attention to the group factor makes space for an argument that the
childhood socialization of women, and their experience of developing the
social status associated with womanhood, is relevant to the work of rape crises
centres and women's shelters. That work can be both therapeutic and political.
It can be argued that the anti-discrimination norm does not require people to
be treated as interchangeable individuals rather than as members of groups
with distinctive and meaningful life experiences and with political
perspectives on those life experiences.
The distinctive nature of group cases can perhaps be best illustrated by
turning to the first step of the discrimination analysis - that of whether a
distinction has been made. With respect to a group, a complainant is both
treated differently from people eligible to be members, and the same as those
who are ineligible. Thus the question of the comparator group should be seen
as not susceptible to an easy answer.'00 In Nixon, Rape Relief argued that,
99 The point that most human rights cases involve individuals while the recent s. 15 cases
have not surely does not justify inconsistency. All cases have a group and individual element. In
Nixon itself, the group, persons who have the life experience of being treated as male, was
excluded, as was the individual, Kimberly Nixon. Law affected both the group, surviving
spouses under 45, and the individual, Nancy Law.
100 In Nixon, it at first appeared to be assumed that the comparator group was women with
the life experience of being treated as women, or that there is no need for a comparator in
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from a subjective/objective perspective, an appropriate comparator group is
women who do not accept Rape Reliefs political beliefs, which focus on
oppression from birth, and includes women who identify themselves as pro-
life, who are not prepared to work against racism and do not accept that
women have the right to love whom they will. The complainant could thus be
seen, in a dignified way, as part of a sub-category of women whose political
beliefs were significantly different from those of Rape Relief.
A true contextual approach also leaves space for the recognition of the
value of diversity. One way in which diversity can flourish is through respect
for a variety of non-governmental groups. Healthy and active non-
governmental groups are an important feature of Canadian life.
B. DO DEFENCES REFLECT THE SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH?
Nixon did not require attention to dignity at any stage in the analysis (although
it "may" occur at the defences stage). This absence of a requirement of a
human dignity analysis means that a respondent, including an equality-seeking
group, can be found to have breached human rights legislation, and ordered to
pay damages for injury to dignity, without any analysis of whether there was
any actual injury to dignity (as understood in the constitutional jurisprudence).
This raises the question of whether human rights defences incorporate the
elements of the Law analysis so that it can be said that the bottom line
determination of a breach of human rights legislation reflects overall
consistency with the Charter. It might be argued that inconsistency is justified
by the fact that it is the bottom line (after defences have been included in the
analysis) that reflects substantive equality rather than the first-step
discrimination question. If that were the case, then the only inconsistency that
would remain would be the allocation of the burden of proof, discussed below.
So a significant doctrinal issue relates to the question of the role of at least
some defences if discrimination were given a meaning consistent with the
Charter. This concern is not exclusive to the human rights field, as the inter-
relationship of s. 15, subsections (1) and (2), has been a matter of debate, as
mentioned above and discussed in Lovelace. In that context the issue is at least
currently resolved by approaching s. 15(2) as confirmatory of the substantive
equality approach to s. 15(1), although leaving open the possibility that it
might also have some independent role.
Using the bona fide occupational requirement (BFOR) and bona fide
justification (BFJ) defences as examples, it can be seen that there is some, but
not complete overlap between the Law analysis and these defences. There are
three elements to such defences: rational connection, good faith, and
human rights law. The arguments later developed, a comparison being drawn between male to
female transsexuals and women capable of being mistaken for men.
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reasonable necessity. The most striking difference is the requirement of good
faith. The Law analysis of discrimination does not turn on good faith. A
claimant, rightly, does not have to show bad faith. Requiring a respondent to
prove good faith is a factor independent of the Law contextual analysis, which
suggests that these are defences proper rather than elements of a
discrimination analysis. The argument, roughly, is: "Well, what I did was
discrimination, but I did it, in good faith, for a good reason." The "good
reason" aspect is reflected in the requirements of rational connection and
reasonable necessity. The rational connection could be seen as roughly
equivalent to the correspondence factor in Law. Reasonable necessity requires
that the respondent show that it cannot accommodate the complainant without
undue hardship. There may be some overlap with the contextual approach
here, since a reasonable complainant would take hardship into account. Undue
hardship, however, bears more similarity to a s. 1 analysis under the Charter
in which considerations other than those internal to the anti-discrimination
norm may justify discrimination.
It is clear that these defences would not operate to protect respondents in
all cases where a contextual analysis would protect them and would excuse
respondents in some cases where a contextual analysis would not. Thus bad
faith state action could be defended as not discrimination under the contextual
approach, and a human rights respondent could argue that undue hardship
justifies a distinction that would otherwise be discriminatory.
The same is true of group exemptions, which typically have quite narrow
requirements, for instance, that the respondent be a non-profit organization,
and of affirmative action defences. What role would these defences play were
a substantive approach to be taken to discrimination? Affirmative action
defences can be seen as playing a role similar to that of s. 15(2). With respect
to group exemptions, it may be helpful to consider the underlying values at
stake and the different types of groups that might claim exemption. For
instance, the group exemption provision in British Columbia, s. 41, is drafted
in terms that do not distinguish between equality-seeking and other groups. An
alternative approach, where there is a clash of equality claims so to speak,
would be to analyse equality-seeking groups under the concept of
discrimination, leaving s. 41 for groups whose nature simply pits freedom of
association against non-discrimination. In this latter situation, exclusion would
be inconsistent with human dignity but justified (under narrow circumstances)
by the right io associate. Narrow requirements for successful group exemption
arguments and the placement of the burden of proof on respondents seem
more appropriate for non equality-seeking groups than for equality-seeking
groups. There seems no reason, for example, why a women's group should be
not be able to make a profit. An approach sensitive to context, in the sense of
the nature of the group at issue, would leave group exemptions with a role to
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play, and avoid forcing human rights promoting groups through the same
narrow hoop as other groups.
There may, however, be some appeal, in terms of the coherence of the
legislation, to seeing substantive equality as reflected in the bottom line rather
than the issue of whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination. Aside
from concerns that the legislation does not provide sufficient doctrinal
coverage to ensure a contextual analysis, there is a more significant objection
to the bottom line approach, which has influenced the position taken by the
Supreme Court of Canada.
C. REVERSE DISCRIMINATION BACKLASH?
The bottom line approach gives rise to a very significant objection on the level
of our basic orientation to equality, as stated in Lovelace.
Colleen Sheppard ... pointed out that interpreting s. 15(2) as an exemption or
defence requires the courts to inappropriately frame equity programs as
constituting prima facie violations of s. 15(1). Such a view is inconsistent with the
substantive equality analysis and encourages a negative approach to ameliorative
programs. In this regard, she stated, at p. 2:
... equity programs should be understood as integral to, and
consistent with, legal guarantees of equality for historically
disadvantaged groups in society, thereby rejecting the view that
affirmative action is a source of discrimination. Thus, affirmative
action is presented as an expression of equality, rather than an
exception to it.''
This possible effect is part of a more general legal, but more importantly
political, effect of labelling affirmative action as discrimination, feeding into a
mind-set favourable to reverse discrimination backlash. That is, a more formal
equality approach stigmatizes affirmative action as discrimination. It silences
the view that a contextual, respectful, recognition of difference can be basic to
equality.
D. THE BURDEN OF PROOF?
The allocation of the burden of proof has both a doctrinal and a more political
dimension. A formal, rather than a substantive, approach to discrimination,
coupled with defences with the burden of proof placed on the respondent,
means that doubt, with respect to the facts of a case having to do with the
context of a distinction, is managed in favour of complainants. In the vast
101 Lovelace, supra note 27 at para. 101, citing Colleen Sheppard, Litigating the




majority of cases, this may, and should, mean that doubt is resolved in favour
of human rights. However, in cases where the respondent is an equality-
seeking group, there is no public interest in favour of managing doubt in a
way that disadvantages the respondent. Fact-finding may involve under-
researched issues, such as whether and how women are a disadvantaged
group, whether and how transgendered persons are a disadvantaged group, or
whether raped women might be traumatized by encountering people they
perceive as male in a women-only space. Placing a burden of proof on a
women's group in a world without socially validated sources of information
about women can be seen as an exercise in discrimination in itself. This may
lead to labelling women's groups as discriminatory and force them to prove
some defence, relying on knowledge that may not be recognized, such as
respected feminist psychiatric knowledge, and research into the impact on
traumatized women of unexpectedly encountering people without the life
experience of women.1
0 2
E. THE ROLE OF THE STATE?
The result of the divergence between constitutional law and human rights law
exposes respondents to the risk of being held liable for discrimination where
governments would not have been found to have acted contrary to s. 15. This
could be justified on two grounds. First, governments are entitled to deference
and non-governmental associations are not. Second, since bills of rights set
minimal standards, there is no reason why the state should not demand more
of itself and/or private individuals or groups.
It is possible to think of strong reasons why state priorities and programs
are entitled to deference. Sheer complexity is one. Governments have to take
into account many complex, overlapping and competing interests, including
financial factors, international obligations, constitutional division of powers
and political concerns. Democracy is another, since the judiciary might well
see it as proper to defer to some extent to the decisions of elected
representatives, even while carrying out the judicial role of protecting
fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter.
However, one can leap too quickly to the conclusion that lack of a need for
deference justifies a different approach to discrimination in the human rights
field. There are several reasons for this:
0 it is -misleading to say governments are entitled to deference, since a
broad range of government activity, such as employment, is subject to
102 Of course, it is not a concern exclusive to women that the state may place the burden of
proof on groups lacking the resources to meet it. See e.g. Christine Boyle & Marilyn
MacCrimmon, "To Serve the Cause of Justice: Disciplining Fact Determination" (2001) 20
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 55 at 66-69 (with respect to aboriginal claims).
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the human rights complaint process and some human rights
legislation, such as that of Alberta, renders inconsistent legislation
inoperative;
* the very fact that the state enjoys deference while non-governmental
programs or groups do not heightens the need for a more contextual
analysis of discrimination rather than weakening it;
* the role of deference can be overstated if one neglects the critique of it
as diminishing the judicial role in protecting human rights;
* references to deference without analysis of its justification risks
diminishing the purposive approach to human rights interpretation. A
superficial institutional point (i.e. this is a private not a public
respondent) replaces attention to human rights values. Even assuming
deference to governments, there may well be other reasons for
deference, including the nature of a particular respondent as an
equality-seeking group. If there is to be deference to an assessment
about the needs and interests of a group, in this case women, there
may well be more of a risk that the government will get this wrong
than that a non-governmental women's group itself will;
* the complexity and democracy arguments are not completely
irrelevant with respect to non-governmental groups. They too may
have to make complex decisions with respect to the service they can
offer and to whom. More significantly, groups whose interests may
not be a priority in the mainstream political process should be seen as
having a distinctive claim to having their self-definition respected;
* there is another form of deference which should be considered here.
Basically human rights tribunals would be asserting that they have a
better understanding of discrimination than do judges interpreting the
constitution;
* state-sanctioned distinctions may have a greater negative effect on
dignity than those drawn in the world of non-governmental groups, a
world in which the state recognizes the human rights-enhancing role
of groups;
" the bottom line is that the position that human rights decision-makers
and judges should show deference to the state but not to independent
women's groups is not obviously persuasive.
Similarly, we should not leap too quickly to the conclusion that a formal
approach is more or better than the minimal Charter protection from
discrimination. Since the focus of this paper is on equality claims in conflict, a
formal approach could just as easily be seen as lowering, rather than
increasing, protection from discrimination. Of course, the remedy for such a
negative impact would be a claim that a formal approach discriminates against
groups on the basis of whatever ground they are organizing around. The idea
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of challenging formal equality as discriminatory with respect to groups who
need substantive equality to improve their status is a complex one which may
not translate easily to litigation, but in theory it challenges any assumption that
the human rights approach is more than the constitutional minimum.
F. NEGLECT OF THE INTERESTS OF THIRD PARTIES?
It is now trite law in Canada that constitutional rights are to be construed as
co-existing rather than in a hierarchical fashion. 10 3 An approach consistent
with this in the human rights field would include an analysis of the co-existing
rights of complainants, respondent equality-seeking groups and any third
parties.
A substantive approach is flexible enough to permit attention to the
interests of third parties, in contrast to the more rigid formal approach coupled
with statutory defences. One way of stating the issue is how to be attentive to
the human rights of both transgendered persons, raped and beaten women
seeking help from a women-only space, and women with the life experience
of being treated as women who want to combat male violence. This has not
been decided, as far as I can tell, in any comparable jurisdiction. However,
other jurisdictions are struggling with similar issues brought to the fore by
increasing attention to the human rights of transgendered persons. Although
the analysis rarely touches directly on discrimination, analogies suggesting
attentiveness to the interests of raped and beaten women are apparent.
Even though it is now rare for a person's sexual classification to matter in
law, the biological, psychological, sociological and political meanings of sex
or gender are still the subject of debate and evolving understanding, both here
and in other jurisdictions. Canadian law does not permit an individual to
choose what sex will be designated in that individual's birth records, and it
does not even accept completion of sexual reassignment surgery for changing
such designation in all circumstances. Section 27 of the British Columbia
Vital Statistics Act' °4 permits a change of sex designation in birth registration,
but only for those individuals who are unmarried at the time of the application
103 See Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 D.L.R. (4th)
12 (per Lamer C.J.C. for the majority: "A hierarchical approach to rights, which places some
over others, must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the
common law. When the protected rights of two individuals come into conflict, as can occur in
the case of publication bans, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully
respects the importance of both sets of rights" at para. 75).
104 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479. For other legislation allowing changes of designation in varying
or unspecified circumstances, see S.A. 2000, c. 33, s. 22; C.C.S.M. c. V60, s. 25; N.B.C.S.
2000, c. V-3, s. 34; R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 494, s. 25; R.S.O. 1990, c. V.4, s. 36; R.S.P.E.I. 1993, c.
V-4.1, s. 12; S.S. 1995, c. V-7.1, s. 29; R.S.Y. 2002, c. 225, s. 12; R.S.N.L., 1990, c. V-6, s. 19;
S.Q. 1991, c. 64, ss. 71-73.
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for a change in designation. Canadian federal law does not yet address the
possibility of changing sex, nor explain the effects of sexual reassignment
surgery, although changes to the law on capacity to marry will have an
obvious impact on such effects.'0 5 It is not clear what effect the information on
a birth certificate has on legal status. 10 6 Nor is there any law that has
determined that these different pathways to sex designation, or different life
experience, must be ignored for all purposes. There is some case law showing
the beginnings of struggle with the legal issues relating to transgendered
persons, which shows some attentiveness to the interests of others.
105 See Halpern v. Canada (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529, 172 O.A.C. 276 (C.A.); EGALE
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472, 2003 BCCA 251,
varied (2003), 228 D.L.R. (4th) 416, 2003 BCCA 406; Hendricks c. Canada (Procteurginral)
(2003), J.E. 2003-466, [2003] J.Q. No. 343 (QL) (C.A.). Obviously if sex is irrelevant to
capacity to marry, marriage should also be irrelevant with respect to a change in birth
registration. The House of Lords has recently addressed the issue of capacity to marry in
Bellinger v.Bellinger, [2003] 2 All E.R. 593, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1174, [2003] UKHL 21, which
contains a useful discussion of case law in various jurisdictions. The Court held that a person
classified as male at birth could not then become a woman in the context of marriage law, but
that this was not compatible with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Freedoms. The complexity of the legal issues relating to changes of sex designation was
recognized. For instance, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated at para. 32:
Thus the circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, gender reassignment is
recognized are matters of much importance. These are not easy questions. The
circumstances of transsexual people vary widely. The distinction between male and
female is material in widely differing contexts. The criteria appropriate for
recognizing self-perceived gender in one context, such as marriage, may not be
appropriate in another, such as competitive sport.
Further, at para.45:
the recognition of gender reassignment for the purposes of marriage is part of a wider
problem which should be considered as a whole and not dealt with in a piecemeal
fashion. There should be a clear, coherent policy. The decision regarding recognition
of gender reassignment for the purpose of marriage cannot sensibly be made in
isolation from a decision on the like problem in other areas where a distinction is
drawn between people on the basis of gender. These areas include education, child
care, occupational qualifications, criminal law (gender-specific offences), prison
regulations, sport, the needs of decency, and birth certificates. Birth certificates,
indeed, are one of the matters of most concern to transsexual people, because birth
certificates are frequently required as proof of identity or age or place of birth. When,
and in what circumstances, should these certificates be capable of being reissued in a
revised form which does not disclose that the person has undergone gender
reassignment?
106 However, see Gill v. Murray, 2001 BCHRT 34, tribunal order varied, British Columbia
(Minister of Health Planning) v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) (2003), 17
B.C.L.R. (4th) 193, 2003 BCSC 1112, a case relating to the registration of same sex partners as
parents on birth certificates, where it was stated, at para. 76, with respect to the effect of a birth
certificate: "While the birth certificate is not a declaration of legal parentage, the Act provides
that registration is prima facie proof of the relationship (s. 41)."
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Relevant case law can be found in the United Kingdom. In X, Y, and Z v.
United Kingdom, 10 7 X was a female-to-male transsexual living with Y and a
child, Z, born to Y as a result of artificial insemination. X was prohibited from
being registered as the child's father even though the law of the United
Kingdom allows the biological male partner of a woman who has given birth
as a result of artificial insemination to be so registered.
X, Y and Z recognized that "transsexuality raises complex scientific, legal,
moral and social issues". 118 The case involved a possible conflict of interests,
between persons in the position of X and children, since "it is not clear that it
[registration] would necessarily be to the advantage of such children" and
"might have undesirable or unforeseen ramifications for children in Z's
position".' °9 There was therefore no obligation for the State to recognize as the
father of a child a person who is not the biological father."0 The case is
distinct from Nixon in a number of significant ways. There is no equivalent to
such provisions as the B.C. Vital Statistics Act in English law. The
Commission analysed the issue in relation to respect for family life rather than
discrimination, but it stated that a separate discrimination analysis would be
duplicative. A discrimination analysis would thus duplicate attention to the
interests of third parties such as children, illustrating an approach that does not
assume that the interests of third parties are to be treated as irrelevant to the
discrimination analysis.
On the other hand, R. (on the application of E.) v. Ashworth Hospital
Authority.' more closely resembles the dominant human rights approach in
Canada. It also illustrated attention to the interests of third parties, but at the
justification stage. The issue was whether it was lawful for Ashworth Hospital
Authority (a special hospital where patients are detained, in men's and
women's wards and in conditions of high security), to prevent the claimant, a
46 year-old man, from dressing as a woman outside his own room. The
claimant was detained for reasons separate from the issue of cross-dressing.
Medical experts disagreed about the medical diagnosis with respect to cross-
dressing. For example, the medical officer responsible for the claimant was of
the opinion that he was a fetishistic transvestite, who wished to wear women's
clothes for sexual arousal, that dressing publicly as a woman would interfere
with his treatment, and, based on his history, would lead to him to behave in
an unwise manner and put others, such as female staff, at risk. The Head of a
107 [1997] 2 F.L.R. 892, 24 E.H.R.R.143 [X, Yand Z].
108 Ibid. at para. 52.
109 Ibid. at para. 47.
110 Ibid. at para. 52.
111 [2001] EWHC Admin 1089 (Q.B. Admin. C.).
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Gender Identity Clinic took the view that the claimant was a transsexual, with
a clinically recognized need to live as a woman. He was being denied an
effective opportunity to express his gender dysphoria. Without attempting to
resolve the medical issue, the court took the view that "the therapeutic and
security concerns ... are rational and cannot be dismissed as insubstantial ...
merely because they are of a generalized nature." ' 1 2 Further:
I also consider that weight can properly be placed on the wider concerns expressed
by the hospital as to the therapeutic and security risks in relation to other patients
if the claimant were permitted the freedom that he seeks. What one patient is
permitted to do in a high security hospital is plainly capable of affecting others
within the hospital environment and there can be no rational basis for leaving the
impact on others out of account. It is true that the wider concerns are of a
generalized nature, but that does not destroy their force. They are based on a
knowledge and understanding of the patient group and of the complex problems of
managing such patients within the hospital environment.13
There is a danger in analysing security of the person concerns, as in
Ashworth, as a justification for infringing the equality rights of others. As
argued by Donna Greschner with respect to substantive equality at the
constitutional level:
labelling every distinction on enumerated or analogous grounds as a violation of
equality.. .is inconsistent with substantive equality itself. Only violations of
substantive equality should offend section 15; denying driver's licences to six-
year-olds, for example, should not he held to violate equality rights. Neither
should affirmative action programs, or special educational programs for children
with disabilities ...
The formalist approach ... also cheapens rights talk. It labels any deviation from
identical treatment, even for the most meritorious reasons, as an infringement upon
constitutional rights. Consequently, even if the impugned laws are easily justified
under either section 1 or section 15(2), unsuccessful litigants will leave courtrooms
armed with findings of constitutional violations, which gives these litigants more
rhetorical ammunition in political debate.' 
14
Lack of clear attention to the interests of vulnerable or equality-seeking third
parties at the discrimination stage thus gives groups claiming rights against
them power to claim the moral and political high ground. This danger is
discussed below.
112 Ibid. at para. 27.
113 Ibid. at para. 47.
114 Greschner, supra note 8 at 309-10 [emphasis added].
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G. SUPPORT FOR FORMAL EQUALITY?
Most importantly, the implications of having two parallel, but different,
approaches to discrimination should be considered. Concern has been raised
about the costs of a formal approach to discrimination, with more substantive
arguments being left to be established as defences by human rights
respondents. To the extent that the substantive, constitutional, approach is a
good thing, it should influence both legislative developments and
interpretations of discrimination at the human rights level. Of course, the
process could work the other way, with human rights law influencing the
constitutional meaning of discrimination. 15 It cannot be assumed that the
commitment to substantive equality is so strong that it is not in danger of
sliding into a more formal approach, influenced by human rights support for
the latter. Indeed, some might take the view that the constitutional
jurisprudence already reflects formal equality in practice.
The case of Lavoie v. Canada' 6 could be seen as an illustration of the
danger of undermining substantive equality, given the concerns of Arbour J.
This case raised the issue of whether giving Canadian citizens preference in
federal public service employment was a violation of the claimants' s. 15
equality rights. Four judges'1 7 of the Supreme Court held that this was
contrary to s. 15 but saved by s. 1. Three judges"8 agreed that it was contrary
to s. 15 but would not have found it saved by s. 1. Arbour and Le Bel JJ., in
separate judgements, would not have found it contrary to s. 15. Here the
Supreme Court appears to have returned to complex splits in their reasoning,
suggesting that the Law synthesis masked on-going division. The difference
within the majority turned on the third branch of the Law discrimination
analysis, in particular how the reasonable non-citizen would view the
preference. This is a challenging issue, since the very concept of citizen
presupposes difference, a country being a "group" par excellence, providing a
striking example of the creation of insiders and outsiders. A non-citizen living
in any country might well be unsurprised to find that there are legal
differences between her status and that of a citizen, and find that inoffensive in
terms of human dignity. Indeed, it is pointed out that
[it] may be ... that a law defining the core rights and privileges of citizens is
incapable of perpetuating such a view [that non-citizens are less worthy of
115 This may be particularly dramatic in Alberta, where a constitutional government
program could be found to infringe the human rights legislation, if inconsistent approaches are
adopted.
116 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, 2002 SCC 23 [Lavoie].
117 Gonthier, lacobucci, Major and Bastarache, JJ.
118 McLachlin C.J.C., L'Heureux-Dubd and Binnie JJ., dissenting.
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recognition or value as human beings or as members of Canadian society]; indeed,
such a law finds support in numerous international treaties and is accepted by
almost every country in the world.1 19
There is not a striking difference between the subjective/objective test as
expressed by Arbour J., and the more subjective test expressed in the plurality
judgement of Bastarache J. The latter expressed the test as requiring a
contextualized look at how a non-citizen legitimately feels ... Even if the non-
citizen knows the preference has nothing to do with her capabilities - as most
reasonable people would - she may still feel "less ... worthy of recognition ... as a
member of Canadian society" ... This subjective view must be examined in
context, that is, with a view to determining whether a rational foundation exists for
the subjective belief. 20
The former, Arbour J., placed more emphasis on the objective aspect of the
test, quoting from Law, including that the "objective component means that it
is not sufficient ... for a claimant simply to assert, without more, that his or
her dignity has been adversely affected by a law" and that "the relevant point
of view is that of the reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised of the
circumstances". 
12 1
The application of the test, however, produced very different results, with
Bastarache J. taking the view that given how vital employment is to livelihood
and self-worth, and the lack of any apparent link between citizenship and
ability to perform a particular job, the claimants felt legitimately burdened by
the idea that their professional development was stifled. Further,
discrimination in work and employment has the potential to marginalize
immigrants, "whether or not the discrimination operates on the basis of
stereotyping; if it makes immigrants feel less deserving of concern, respect
and consideration, it runs afoul of s. 15(1)".122 (Remember, however, that the
discrimination was justified under s. 1.) Arbour J. took the view that "there is
a valid state interest in tying the receipt of certain benefits to citizenship such
that the withholding of those benefits from non-citizens cannot constitute an
affront to human dignity.' ' 23
Of particular relevance to this paper are Arbour J.'s concerns about the
implications of the plurality approach, which reveal a significant difference of
119 Lavoie, supra note 116 at para. 46, Bastarache J.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. at para. 79, quoting Law, supra note 2 at para. 59.
122 Lavoie, supra note 116 at para. 52 [emphasis added]. This gives support to Greschner's
criticism of the concept of dignity, supra note 8 at 312-13, that it "becomes an assertion, not an
analysis".
123 Lavoie, supra note 116, at para. 117.
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opinion about the work to be done by s. 15 and s. 1 respectively. Her concern,
in general terms, is that applying, in effect, a subjective test tends to make it
too easy to show a breach of s. 15 and too easy to show a justification under s.
1. It echoes the Greschner image of equality rights becoming "like the Rio
Grande river - a mile wide, but only an inch deep."'124 Being quick to find a
breach means more pressure on s. 1 to salvage a plethora of laws, in order to
"avoid unravelling the legislative process", thus denuding equality rights of
their meaning "while paying lip service to a broad and generous concept of
equality."' 125 She went on to say:
Where conducting the discrimination analysis from the perspective of the claimant
alone allows the fair terms of interaction by the individual and the state - the
boundaries of individual rights - to be unilaterally determined by the claimant,
attention to the objective component in the analysis recognizes the essentially
bilateral character of rights. In the end a rights claim is nothing other than a legally
binding demand for recognition of, and respect for, one's interests on the part of
others. As a result it cannot avoid engaging the interests of those others. For if
others are to be duty-bound to respect one's rights, fairness requires that they be
given some say, that their own interests be taken account of, in determining those
rights. 2
6
The more subjective, and thus easier, the claim of violation of human dignity,
the closer an avowedly substantive equality approach comes to formal
equality.
While the more recent case of Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney
General)127 shows a unanimous application of the subjective/objective
approach, in finding that ss. 3(1)(b) and 3(6)(b) of the Vital Statistics Act'
2 8
violated s. 15(1) of the Charter on the basis of sex, it too might be seen as
embodying formal equality. The Act allowed a mother to "unacknowledge" a
father on a birth certificate thereby preventing the father from participating in
the naming of the child. Further once the certificate was registered the father
was left with no recourse to amend the document absent the mother's consent.
The key to the ruling was the fact that a reasonable father would perceive his
dignity as being infringed, 2 9 with little or no analysis of the broader social
context including the interests of care-giving mothers in naming their children.
124 Greschner, supra note 8 at 306.
125 Lavoie, supra note 116 at para. 86.
126 Ibid. at para. 88.
127Trociuk, supra note 37.
128 Supra note 11.
129 Trociuk, supra note 37 at para. 25.
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If Lavoie, and even Trociuk, is evidence that we are in danger of thus
abandoning Andrews, concern about the influence of human rights law on this
process is justified.
Not only may the human rights approach contribute to an atmosphere in
which analysis tending toward formal equality is appealing as the easiest to
apply and justify, Arbour J.'s critique highlights the implications of the
contrast between human rights and the Charter. The dominant view of the
human rights structure is that the interests of others are taken into account
only at the defence stage, where human rights respondents enjoy no deference.
Thus, in contrast to Arbour J.'s concern about the Charter, it may be both easy
to make a prima facie case and hard to prove a defence, even in a case where
there are strong human rights interests at stake on the side of the respondent.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are some reasons why human rights bodies tend to have adopted a more
formal approach. Chiefly, human rights legislation covers a limited range of
situations, such as services and employment, while the Charter applies to the
whole potential range of legislation and government programs. As well, most
complaints are quite straightforward. In most cases, taking into consideration
any of the factors covered by the grounds of discrimination would be
obviously improper, such as, usually, where the complainant shows race to
have been a factor in denying employment. However, in more complex cases
involving equality-seeking group respondents there are much stronger
arguments for a substantive approach. Human rights tribunals and courts are
now being asked to address the question of whether groups which are formed
to address particular forms of oppression, and thus are not inclusive of all
forms of oppression, are discriminating. An unreflective application of a
formal approach designed for simpler issues, or mere lip-service to a
contextual approach, is inadequate for the challenge posed by such issues.
On the other hand, the very critique of formal equality reminds one of the
dangers of a one size fits all approach. A discrimination complaint brought by
a transgendered person against an airline, which refused to employ her on that
basis, is very different from a complaint brought by a man against a women-
only shelter for raped and battered women. Analysis of the latter should not be
forced into a mould suitable for the former. But conversely, recognition of this
should not promote unnecessary complexity for the former. Mr. Justice
Edwards in Vancouver Rape Relief, addressed this concern:
The Court in Law recognized that while claimants bear the onus of establishing
infringement of their s. 15(1) Charter equality rights, it is not necessarily the case
that the claimant must adduce evidence to show a violation of human dignity or
freedom, particularly where differential treatment is based on an enumerated
2004
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ground and it will be evident on the basis of judicial notice and logical reasoning
that the distinction is discriminatory.'
30
The thrust of this paper is that, whether through legislative reform or
judicial interpretation, the concept of discrimination in human rights law
should reflect a commitment to substantive equality. Equality-seeking group
respondents can then make contextual and purposive arguments. However, is
it possible to have the best of both worlds? The best situation would appear to
be an easy case for most complainants to prove, with a more complex analysis
reserved for cases with legitimate equality concerns on both sides. Such an
ideal approach should not present a challenge. The cases so far where a more
complex analysis has been required have been cases of programs and groups.
In other words, they do not deal with goods, services or employment open to
everyone. Thus, there are automatically insiders and outsiders and the question
is not whether distinctions are permitted but rather which distinctions.
Unusual cases such as Nixon and Keyes add another layer of complexity with
the groups in question having human rights goals. Given the overall purposes
of human rights law, the meaning of discrimination should be sophisticated
enough to be attentive to such differences in claims and in particular to
whether there are co-existing human rights at stake.
130 Supra note 5 at para. 130.
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